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A B S T R A C T
We investigate the short-term effects of ﬁscal adjustment on eco-
nomic activity in 20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009.We compare
two approaches: the traditional approach based on changes in cy-
clically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and the narrative approach
based on historical records. Proponents of the latter argue that it
captures discretionary ﬁscal adjustment more accurately than the
traditional approach.We propose a new deﬁnition of CAPB that takes
account of ﬂuctuations in asset prices and reﬂects idiosyncratic fea-
tures of ﬁscal policy in individual countries. Using this new deﬁnition,
we ﬁnd that ﬁscal adjustments always have contractionary effects
on economic activity in the short term; we ﬁnd no evidence of ex-
pansionary (non-Keynesian) ﬁscal adjustments. Spending-based ﬁscal
adjustments lead to smaller output losses than tax-based ﬁscal ad-
justment. These results are in line with the literature using the
narrative approach, suggesting that the CAPB, when correctly speci-
ﬁed, can be used as a measure of ﬁscal adjustments.
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1. Introduction
The recent global economic and ﬁnancial crisis and the associated ﬁscal austerity in the Eurozone
and elsewhere have resulted in a renewed interest in the relationship between ﬁscal reform and
economic growth. Although there is widespread agreement that reducing public deﬁcits and debt has
important beneﬁts in the long term, there is less of a consensus regarding the short-term effects of
ﬁscal adjustment. In part, this is because of the oft-quoted examples of Denmark and Ireland, which
experienced improved growth performance after periods of strict ﬁscal austerity in the 1980s.1 Their
experience deﬁes the conventional Keynesian theory which predicts negative short-run economic effects
of restrictive ﬁscal policy. Subsequently, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina
and Ardagna (1998, 2010) and others sought to ﬁnd other examples of such expansionary ﬁscal ad-
justments and argued that ﬁscal adjustment can stimulate economic growth even in the short term,
in a phenomenon referred to as ‘Non-Keynesian effects’ or ‘expansionary ﬁscal contraction’.
Typically, the empirical studies seeking evidence of expansionary ﬁscal adjustments rely on ob-
serving changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). The CAPB is an indicator that captures
discretionary ﬁscal policy and other noncyclical factors by excluding the automatic effects of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations (through transfers, taxes and interest payments) on the budget.2 However, Guajardo
et al. (2014) criticize this approach on the grounds that using the CAPB can yield misidentiﬁed ﬁscal
adjustment episodes. In particular, they argue that improvements in the CAPB due to stock-market
booms and/or one-off ﬁscal revenues can be misclassiﬁed as ﬁscal reforms. They favor a narrative ap-
proach, based on careful study of historical documents to identify ﬁscal adjustments episodes. Applying
this to a sample of OECD countries, they fail to identify any expansionary ﬁscal adjustments.
In this paper, we build on and extend the work of Guajardo et al. (2014). We consider 20 OECD
countries so that our scope is similar to that of their paper. In contrast to their approach, we use the
CAPB instead of the narrative approach. However, we modify the CAPB to take account of the prob-
lems that Guajardo et al. (2014) point out. In particular, we construct the CAPBmeasure so that it reﬂects
ﬂuctuations in asset prices and takes into account the heterogeneity of ﬁscal policy across countries.
Using this newmeasure of ﬁscal adjustment, we obtain results that are very similar to those that Guajardo
et al. (2014) obtain with the narrative approach. With our modiﬁed CAPB measure, we ﬁnd no evi-
dence of Non-Keynesian effects. Nevertheless, our results conﬁrm that spending-based ﬁscal adjustments
have more beneﬁcial macroeconomic effects than tax-based ﬁscal adjustments, which is in line with
the previous theoretical and empirical evidence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on
the effects of ﬁscal adjustments. In section 3, we explain our new measure to identify ﬁscal adjust-
ments and list the ﬁscal adjustment episodes that we identify. Section 4 outlines the empirical framework
and presents the results. Section 5 examines the robustness of our results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
2.1. Theory
There is a general agreement that ﬁscal consolidation and the resulting reduced government debt
contribute to long-run economic growth. However, there is disagreement about the short-term effect.
Keynesian economics predicts that a cut in government spending or an increase in taxes reduces the
aggregate demand and income directly, which leads to negative multiplier effects on the output in
the short term. As a result, government debt to output ratio may not be reduced much or at all because
both output and tax revenues fall due to the contractionary effects of the ﬁscal adjustment.
1 According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), the sharp ﬁscal contractions (primary ﬁscal deﬁcit reduction equal to 10% of GDP
in Denmark during 1983–1986 and 7% of GDP in Ireland during 1987–1988 were accompanied by average real growth of 3.6%
and 3.7%, respectively.
2 The CAPB is calculated by taking the actual primary balance (balance minus net-interest payment) and subtracting the es-
timated effects of business cycles on the budget.
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In contrast, Neoclassical economics predicts that ﬁscal adjustments can stimulate the economy with
an increase in private consumption and investment through several transmission mechanisms even
in the short term. These mechanisms entail both demand and supply side effects. First, on the demand
side, wealth effects or credibility effects are suggested to be at work. Blanchard (1990) proposes a model
in which consumers react to two kinds of effects. One is the intertemporal tax redistribution effect
by non-Ricardian agents in a Keynesian model where an increase in taxes decreases consumption. The
other is due to distortionary effects of taxes, whereby an increase in taxes eliminates the need for a
larger and more disruptive adjustment in the future. As a result, people can expect an increase in their
permanent income due to the future reduction in the deadweight loss, and therefore consume more.
Blanchard argues that if people exhibit little myopia and the ﬁscal adjustment is made from a high
debt level, consumption can react positively. Bertola and Drazen (1993) present an optimizing model
and demonstrate that if a change of ﬁscal policy induces suﬃciently strong expectation of future policy
change in the opposite direction, it can give rise to a nonlinear relationship between private con-
sumption and government spending. If a cut in government spending induces expectation of signiﬁcantly
lower future taxes, it may induce an increase in the current private consumption.
Similarly, Sutherland (1997) links current ﬁscal policy and future expected taxes. His model em-
phasizes the dynamics of government debt and considers consumers with ﬁnite horizons. At low
levels of debt, ﬁscal policy has the usual Keynesian effects because people expect the debt stabiliza-
tion program as something distant from their perspective. On the other hand, at high levels of debt,
as a major ﬁscal consolidation is imminent, people react to government spending in a non-
Keynesian way, expecting that they will have to pay more taxes shortly. Therefore, ﬁscal adjustment
can give rise to positive wealth expectation effects when it occurs under high and rapidly growing
debt-to-GDP ratio.
Other mechanisms include credibility effects, whereby ﬁscal adjustment reduces the default and
inﬂation risk via the decline in interest rates (Feldstein, 1982). When a high level of government debt
affects the interest rate risk premium, a reliable ﬁscal adjustment can reduce the premium and, in
turn, the reduction of interest rate raises permanent income. In addition, lower interest rate can also
lead to the appreciation of ﬁnancial assets which triggers higher consumption and investment. Ex-
pansionary ﬁscal adjustment may take place also on the supply side via the labor market and investment
(Alesina et al., 2002, 2008). If ﬁscal adjustment takes the form of a cut in public spending, especially
in the area of public employment, rather than an increase in taxes, it can lead to a reduction of overall
wage pressure in the economy and stimulate private employment and investment.
2.2. Empirical considerations
There is a large empirical literature seeking to ﬁnd evidence of expansionary ﬁscal adjustments
(non-Keynesian effects) since Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) suggested, based on the examples of Denmark
and Ireland in the 1980s, that large and decisive ﬁscal adjustment can increase private consumption.
Fiscal adjustment is usually identiﬁed as an improvement of CAPB in excess of a chosen threshold over
a given period. Two aspects of ﬁscal adjustments receive attention: the factors that ensure that ﬁscal
adjustments are expansionary or successful, and the effects of ﬁscal adjustments on macroeconomic
outcomes.
The studies interested in the former classify the episodes according to the deﬁnition of expan-
sionary or successful ﬁscal adjustment 3 and then perform a descriptive analysis of the characteristics
of ﬁscal components and other related macroeconomic variables such as GDP and interest rate before,
during, and after the ﬁscal adjustment period (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, 2012; Alesina and
Perotti, 1995, 1997; Giudice et al., 2007; McDermott and Wescott, 1996). These studies tend to ﬁnd
that ﬁscal consolidations based on spending cuts rather than on tax increases are more likely to be
both expansionary and successful. Other papers use binary dependent variable models such as logit
or probit to analyze which factors determine the success of ﬁscal consolidations (Afonso et al., 2006;
3 Following Alesina and Ardagna (2012), we consider a ﬁscal adjustment to be successful if it brings about a sustained re-
duction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, and expansionary, if it is followed by positive economic growth.
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McDermott and Wescott, 1996) and their expansionary effects (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Giudice
et al., 2007). McDermott andWescott (1996) argue that the success in reducing the debt ratio depends
on the size and composition of ﬁscal adjustment. They show that ﬁscal adjustments based on spend-
ing cuts are more likely to be successful than tax-based ones. Furthermore, the greater the magnitude
of ﬁscal adjustment, the more likely it is to succeed. On the other hand, they show that ﬁscal
adjustments are more likely to fail during a global recession. Afonso et al. (2006) assess ﬁscal con-
solidations in Central and Eastern European countries and suggest that spending-based adjustments
were more successful. Giudice et al. (2007), ﬁnally, conclude that ﬁscal consolidation is more likely
to promote economic growth during periods of below potential output and when the ﬁscal adjust-
ment is based on spending cuts.
The latter focus (on macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal adjustments) is less common. Using panel data
of industrial and developing countries, Giavazzi et al. (2000) analyze the relationship between ﬁscal
policy and national savings and conclude that their relationship can be nonlinear when the ﬁscal impulse
is suﬃciently large and persistent, similar to the previous studies on ﬁscal policy and private con-
sumption (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, 1996). Ardagna (2004) studies the determinants and channels
through which ﬁscal adjustment affect growth. She shows that whether a ﬁscal adjustment is expan-
sionary depends largely on the composition of ﬁscal policy, and that spending cuts can lead to higher
growth rates via the labor market rather than through agents’ expectation. On the other hand, Burger
and Zagler (2008) analyze the relation between U.S. growth and ﬁscal adjustments in the 1990s and
argue that non-Keynesian effects prevail through an increase in consumption because of improved
consumer conﬁdence and an increase in investment via the labor market and ﬁnancial market. Afonso
(2010) assesses expansionary ﬁscal adjustment in European countries and ﬁnds that ﬁscal consoli-
dations tend to have long-term expansionary effects, but no signiﬁcant effects in the short-run. Thus,
although there are some differences among these empirical studies in the factors affecting expan-
sionary ﬁscal adjustment such as the size, composition and the initial conditions, overall, the empirical
literature based on ﬁscal adjustment episodes identiﬁed by the changes in the CAPB supports the ex-
istence of non-Keynesian effects.
Several papers, however, take issue with the results of the aforementioned CAPB-based studies.
First, they argue that the results can be plagued by selection bias, measurement error, spurious cor-
relation, or simultaneity issues when identifying ﬁscal consolidation episodes. Using the same panel
data as Giavazzi et al. (2000), Kamps (2006) challenges their ﬁnding that non-Keynesian effects are a
general and easily exploitable phenomenon by showing that the nonlinear effect disappears when cross-
country heterogeneity is taken into account. Park and Song (2010) and Hernández de Cos and
Moral-Benito (2011) raise the possibility of endogeneity of the ﬁscal consolidation decision and ﬁnd
that ﬁscal adjustments have negative effects on GDP when taking this into account.
In line with these criticisms, IMF (2010), Guajardo et al. (2014) and Devries et al. (2011) suggest
an alternative way of identifying ﬁscal consolidations instead of using the CAPB. Their approach is
based on reviewing historical documents, similar to Romer and Romer (2010), to identify discretion-
ary ﬁscal changesmotivated by the desire to reduce the budget deﬁcit. They then compare their episodes
with those of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and show that the episodes identiﬁed using historical data
have contractionary effects on GDP, while the CAPB-based episodes are associated with a rise in GDP.
Hence, using the CAPB is likely to be biased in favor of non-Keynesian effects.
The narrative literature, furthermore, identiﬁes a number of problems related to using the CAPB.
First, using a statistical concept such as the CAPB can be marred by non-policy related developments
such as booms or contractions in the stock market.4 Second, the CAPB-based method is likely to ignore
the motivation behind ﬁscal changes. For example, the rise of CAPB can be aimed at restraining eco-
nomic overheating, not at reducing the budget deﬁcit.5 In addition, it can omit some episodes of ﬁscal
4 They provide an example of Ireland in 2009 when a recession-induced collapse in stock and house prices led to a decrease
of CAPB in 2009 in spite of the on-going ﬁscal consolidation.
5 For example, in responding to the rapid domestic demand growth in Finland in 2000, the government adopted a spending
cut to stabilize the economy.
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adjustment followed by an adverse shock and discretionary ﬁscal stimulus.6 Third, the CAPB data cannot
exclude some cases of offsetting positive changes in the CAPB caused by large one-off accounting op-
eration in the previous year that are unrelated to ﬁscal adjustmentmeasures, such as the capital transfers
of Japan in 1998 and the Netherlands in 1995.7 Based on their new dataset, they conclude that ﬁscal
adjustments have contractionary effects on economic activity, and argue that large spending-based
ﬁscal consolidations cannot be expansionary. On the other hand, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) re-
estimate the effect with new episodes identiﬁed based on the persistence of CAPB changes rather than
on their size. They make a somewhat intermediate conclusion that spending-based adjustments cause
smaller recessions than tax-based ones. They also argue that an expansionary ﬁscal adjustment is pos-
sible when it is combined with accommodating monetary policy.
Last but not least, ﬁscal adjustments may affect the economic activity and vice versa. Countries
are more likely to consider implementing ﬁscal adjustment to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio when they
are experiencing relatively favorable economic growth. Therefore, expansionary ﬁscal adjustments can
be the result of self-selection and the decision to implement a ﬁscal adjustment is endogenous.8 More-
over, as many theoretical studies argue, if wealth effects and expectations are the main channels by
which the ﬁscal adjustments affect economic activity, the episodes identiﬁed by the narrative ap-
proach based upon announced plans for deﬁcit cuts can capture the ﬁscal adjustments and their effects
better and more correctly than those identiﬁed by the CAPB based on actual ﬁscal outcomes.
The main upshot of the preceding discussion is that while the narrative approach seems superior
in identifying ﬁscal adjustment correctly,9 using the CAPB has the advantage in its simple and easy
application. Therefore, if the construction of the CAPB could be improved to reﬂect the problems pointed
out by the narrative approach, the CAPB could be a useful indicator of ﬁscal policy. That is what we
set out to do in the remainder of the paper.
3. Data and identiﬁcation of ﬁscal adjustment episodes
3.1. Data
We use an unbalanced panel of OECD countries covering the period from 1970 to 2009. All ﬁscal
and macroeconomic data are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook No.88.10 The sample in-
cludes 20 countries for which we have data for 20 years or more: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
To identify the instances of discretionary ﬁscal adjustment, we use cyclically adjusted primary ﬁscal
variables. In particular, we use primary ﬁscal variables which exclude interest payments because the
ﬂuctuations in interest payments cannot be regarded as discretionary. To make the cyclical correc-
tion, we follow the method proposed by Blanchard (1993) and used also by Alesina and Perotti (1995,
1997) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010, 2012). It is simpler and more transparent than the more
6 An example is Germany in 1982: although deﬁcit reduction was implemented in 1981, countercyclical stimulus measures
were introduced in 1982 because of a sudden recession.
7 For example, the one-time capital transfers to the Japan National Railway in Japan in 1998 and to the social housing subsidy
in Netherlands in 1995 caused large increases in the CAPB in the following years.
8 See Riera-Crichton et al. (2012) for an extensive discussion of the endogeneity of ﬁscal policy and measures to counter this.
The authors distinguish between two issues: the identiﬁcation of exogenous ﬁscal (tax) policy shocks (i.e., those which are
not the outcome of policymakers’ response to output ﬂuctuations) and the measurement of tax policy (which is under the direct
control of the policymaker). To this end, they construct a novel value-added tax rate data-set for 14 industrial countries for
the 1980–2009 period. They use these data to overcome endogeneity problems, which could arise because (i) tax revenues
constitute a policy outcome, increasing (decreasing) during booms (recessions), and (ii) policymakers typically pursue contractionary
(expansionary) ﬁscal policy during booms (recessions).
9 The ﬁndings of Riera-Crichton et al. (2012) offer support to the notion that the narrative approach is appropriate for iden-
tifying truly exogenous ﬁscal shocks (more so than the SVAR). The authors show that if information obtained from the narrative
approach is incorporated into SVAR estimations, then the resulting tax multipliers are more contractionary than the standard
SVAR estimates.
10 More recent OECD Economic Outlooks cover a more limited period.
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complicated oﬃcial measures such as those of the OECD and IMF which utilize estimates of poten-
tial output and ﬁscal multipliers (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010). The basic principle of this method
is that since the government spending depends negatively on GDP due to unemployment beneﬁts and
the revenues respond positively to GDP due to tax receipts, the changes in the cyclically adjusted ﬁscal
variables can be calculated from the difference between the predicted current-year value (which would
prevail if unemployment had not changed since the previous year) and the actual value in the pre-
vious year.11
The CAPB, however, can also be affected crucially by changes in asset prices. For example,
a stock market boom can increase the cyclically-adjusted tax revenues because of capital gains taxes
as well as increased tax receipts due to higher private consumption and investment. As identiﬁed by
Guajardo et al. (2014), such measurement error, i.e., the correlation between the change in the CAPB
and the error term (in the regression capturing the effect of ﬁscal policy on economic activity) is
likely to be positive, and this could downplay the contractionary effects of ﬁscal consolidation in
using the CAPB. Among other studies that highlight the importance of asset price changes to ﬁscal
policy outcomes, Morris and Schuknecht (2007) ﬁnd that stocks and real estate wealth, which account
for a signiﬁcant share of household and corporate wealth and whose value can change considerably
over a relatively short period of time, are particularly relevant for tax receipts.12 Tagkalakis (2011a,
2011b) also ﬁnds that ﬁnancial markets have a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁscal positions and sug-
gests that higher asset prices improve ﬁscal balances and contribute to initiating a successful ﬁscal
adjustment.13
Therefore, we use a share price index as an additional variable determining the CAPB.14 The impact
on ﬁscal balance, especially tax revenues, can be different according to the types of asset price and
tax systems (Morris and Schuknecht, 2007; Tagkalakis, 2011a). Therefore, when considering asset price
variables as a business cycle factor, it would be ideal to include other types of asset prices such as
equities and property prices. We use only the share price index due to data availability and its par-
ticular relevance to tax revenues. This can be deemed a limitation of our methodology, but we believe
this index is representative of the other asset price movement.15
Our measure of the changes in the CAPB is constructed following Alesina and Ardagna (1998). First,
to get the cyclically adjusted spending as a ratio to GDP, we regress primary spending on a time trend
and the unemployment rate (Ut) for each country in the sample:
G Trend U et t t= + + +α α α0 1 2 (1)
11 As an additional robustness check, we also use the output gap instead of unemployment to cyclically adjust government
spending and revenue. These results are presented in section 5.1.
12 The authors estimate short- (and where relevant) long-term elasticities for four revenue categories (direct taxes on cor-
porations, direct taxes on households, indirect taxes, and taxes on ﬁnancial transactions) with respect to equity and residential
property prices for 16 OECD countries, including 11 EU Member States. Their empirical analysis points to signiﬁcant and pos-
itive asset price effects for all four revenue categories for most countries in the sample. The impact of asset prices seems to be
strongest on transactions taxes and on corporate taxes, while the effects on direct household taxes and indirect taxes tend to
be smaller. However, given the greater importance of the latter two revenue categories, asset price effects on all four catego-
ries seem capable of giving rise to notable budgetary effects. See also Price and Dang (2011), who present econometric estimates
of tax revenue elasticities measuring the response of the major tax categories to house-price and equity-price movements.
13 Other studies that show that the ﬁnancial market variables have signiﬁcant impact on ﬁscal primary balance, particularly
through government revenues, include Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002), Tujula and Wolswijk (2007), Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009), and Tagkalakis (2012).
14 A very recent study by Ardanaz et al. (2015), based on an original dataset comprising 20 Latin American and Caribbean
countries, presents estimates of structural ﬁscal balances in their sample, and attempts to measure the degree of estimation
uncertainty around estimates of the CAPB. This uncertainty arises since the standard formula requires estimation of unob-
served variables (potential output and the corresponding output gap) and parameters (tax and spending elasticities). Furthermore,
Ardanaz et al. (2015) make use of information on output that was available at the time that ﬁscal policy decisions were made.
The authors ﬁnd large differences between theirs and the traditional methods and therefore feel that caution in the use of CAPB
seems warranted.
15 For robustness, we use the house price index instead of the share price index, although the number of observations gets
smaller. The results, reported in the section on robustness, are very similar.
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Then, with the estimated coeﬃcients ( αˆ1 , αˆ2 ) and the preceding-year unemployment rate (Ut-1),
we calculate the value of primary spending adjusted for changes in unemployment:
G U Trend Ut t t* − −( ) = + +1 0 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆα α α (2)
The changes in discretionary spending are calculated as G*t (Ut-1) − Gt-1. A similar procedure is applied
to compute the cyclically adjusted revenues. However, this time, the asset price index is added to the
regression.
R Trend U Assetprice et t t t= + + + +α α α α0 1 2 3 (3)
R U Assetprice Trend U Assetpricet t t t* ,− − −( ) = + + +1 1 0 1 2 1 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆα α α α t−1 (4)
Finally, the changes in discretionary ﬁscal policy are obtained as follows
ΔCAPB R R G Gt t t t= − − −− −[ ] [ ]* *1 1 (5)
Guajardo et al. (2014) criticize the CAPB using the example of Ireland in 2009. In that instance,
the CAPB to GDP ratio, used by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), fell because of the decline in tax receipts
due to the sharp fall in stock and house prices. They argue that this shows the inaccuracy of the CAPB,
as the Irish government was implementing austerity reform at the time. Indeed, our new measure
that takes account of the ﬂuctuations in asset price has the Irish CAPB improving by 1.3% of GDP in
2009.
3.2. Deﬁnition of ﬁscal adjustment
The literature identiﬁes ﬁscal adjustment episodes as large and lasting changes in the CAPB. Table 1
summarizes the deﬁnitions used in the literature: the criteria of size and persistence are consider-
ably different across the various studies, and even a little arbitrary. In addition, although different studies
impose different thresholds, the same threshold is always applied to all countries. In other words, they
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of ﬁscal adjustment.
Study Criteria for the change in the improvement of CAPB
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and
Ardagna (2010)
The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP in 1 year
Alesina and Perotti (1997) The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.25% p of GDP per
year in both two consecutive years
McDermott and Wescott (1996) The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP over 2 years with the improvement of
each year
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Giudice
et al. (2007), Ardagna (2004)
The change is at least 2% p of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.5% p of GDP per year in
both 2 consecutive years
Alesina and Ardagna (2012) The cumulative change is at least 2% p of GDP in 2 consecutive years and at
least 3% p of GDP in 3 or more years with the improvement of each year
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) The cumulative change is at least 5, 4, 3% p of GDP in respectively 4, 3, or 2
consecutive years, or 3% p in 1 year
Giavazzi et al. (2000), Kamps (2006) The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP per year over 2 consecutive years
Afonso et al. (2006) The change is above the average +2/3 times the standard deviation for all
discretionally changes of budget balance in the entire sample
Ahrend et al. (2006), Guichard et al.
(2007)
– Starts if the change is at least 1% p of potential GDP in 1 year or in 2
consecutive years with at least 0.5% p in the ﬁrst of the two years.
– Continues as long as the CAPB improves or deteriorates at most 0.3% p of
GDP but is offset in the following year.
– Terminates if the CAPB stops increasing or improves by less than 0.2% p of
GDP in one year and then deteriorates.
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do not allow for country-speciﬁc heterogeneity in discretionary ﬁscal shocks and the private sector
responses to them. Since the expectations and conﬁdence of the private sector are key factors for the
transmission of ﬁscal shocks, past ﬁscal record should be considered. For example, for a country which
has seldom experienced large changes in discretionary ﬁscal policy, a small ﬁscal adjustment can send
a strong signal of the government’s willingness to reduce the budget deﬁcit. However, for a country
that has had large ﬂuctuations of ﬁscal policy in the past, a similarly sized ﬁscal adjustment can prove
insuﬃcient to elicit any response from the private sector. For example, while Burger and Zagler (2008)
and Guajardo et al. (2014) identify several ﬁscal adjustment episodes in the U.S., Alesina and Ardagna
(2010, 2012) identify none for that country. Therefore, one should consider the idiosyncrasy of ﬁscal
policy in each country. For this reason, we base our deﬁnition of ﬁscal adjustment on the country-
speciﬁc average (μi) and standard deviations (σi) of the changes in the CAPB.
Our deﬁnition for identifying ﬁscal adjustment episodes has 4 criteria, incorporating size, persis-
tence and country-speciﬁc heterogeneity, as follows:
1 A ﬁscal adjustment occurs in a given year if the CAPB improves by at least the average (μi) + stan-
dard deviation (σi) in that year.
2 A ﬁscal adjustment takes place over a period of multiple years when the CAPB improves by at least
μi + 1/3σi in the ﬁrst year and the cumulative change is at least μi + 4/3σi over 2 years or μi + 2σi
over 3 or more years.
3 A spell of ﬁscal adjustment terminates if the CAPB improves by less than μi + 1/3σi or deteriorates
in one year, except when the change in the CAPB is between μi + 1/3σi and μi − 1/3σi in that year,
and the cumulative change over the following year is an improvement of at least μi + 1/3σi.
4 A ﬁscal adjustment does not occur in a given year if the CAPB improves by at least μi + σi in that
year, but in the previous or following year, the CAPB worsens by over μi + σi.
These criteria are chosen for the following reasons. First, as already explained, the different cut-
off values reﬂect the heterogeneity of each country’s ﬁscal policy, as embodied in the average (μi) and
standard deviation (σi) of the changes in the CAPB: the standard deviation (σi) during 1970–2009 ranges
from 3.73% of GDP in Norway to 0.88% in the U.S. Second, the 3rd criterion ensures that episodes when
the CAPB improves little or deteriorates temporarily, but are offset in the following year, are also counted.
Third, the 4th criterion excludes sharp increases in the CAPB due to one-off accounting operations such
as one-time capital transfers. As in the other studies, there is also an element of arbitrariness in our
deﬁnition, in particular in choosing the multiples (1, 1/3, 4/3, 2) of standard deviation. In the robust-
ness section, we use alternative rules and thresholds in order to check whether the results are sensitive
to these values.
According to our deﬁnition, we identify 199 instances of ﬁscal adjustment in 20 OECD countries
from 1970 to 2009. These consist of 66 distinct episodes, as summarized in Table 2 and Figs. 1 and
2.16 These episodes include only those that led to a suﬃciently large improvement in the CAPB. This
list includes several well-known episodes such as Denmark (84–86) and Ireland (82–84, 86–88). Im-
portantly, the episodes that are used by Guajardo et al. (2014) to illustrate the discrepancies between
the two approaches are identiﬁed correctly.17
Note that applying country-speciﬁc thresholds for identifying ﬁscal adjustments need not neces-
sarily imply that the thresholds are generally lower.Whenwe use Alesina and Ardagna’s (2012) deﬁnition
of ﬁscal adjustment but account for the stock market, this results in identifying fewer episodes for
some countries but more episodes for others (results available upon request).
16 Multi-year ﬁscal adjustment is regarded as a single episode following Alesina and Ardagna (2012) because ﬁscal adjust-
ments often are multi-year processes. Moreover, it is very diﬃcult to distinguish the episodes and correct timing during years
of long-lasting improvement of the CAPB. We also introduced each modiﬁcation separately (we are grateful to an anonymous
referee for suggesting this). The list of episodes obtained in this way is available upon request. The three lists overlap to a large
extent. In most cases, implementing only one modiﬁcation results in fewer episodes being identiﬁed, except in the cases of
Ireland, Italy, Korea and Netherlands.
17 Our list includes the episodes of Germany (1982) and Italy (1993), but excludes the episodes of Finland (2000), Germany
(1996), Japan (1999), and Netherlands (1996) just as Guajardo et al. (2014).
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As Fig. 1 shows, most episodes are of short duration. Of the 66 episodes, 11 last for one year, while
19 episodes take two or three consecutive years. The longest episode is 9 years: Japan from 1979 to
1987. Fig. 2 shows that the episodes of ﬁscal adjustment appear most frequently during the 1980s
and 1990s. In particular, we can observe instances of concentrated ﬁscal adjustment of relatively short
duration in the EU countries. This is likely to be related to the Maastricht treaty in 1992 which set
criteria for euro area membership (Guichard et al., 2007).18
18 The Maastricht criteria imposed limits on inﬂation, public debt and the public deﬁcit, exchange rate stability and the con-
vergence of interest rates. In particular, the ratio of government deﬁcit and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP were
not to exceed 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively, at the end of a ﬁscal year.
Table 2
Episodes of ﬁscal adjustment.
Country (sample period) Period No. episodes No. years
Australia (70–09) 77–80, 82–83, 86–88, 91–93, 96–98 5 15
Austria (70–09) 77–81, 84, 96–97, 01, 05–07 5 12
Belgium (86–09) 87, 93–98 2 7
Canada (70–09) 81–83, 86–87, 91–97 3 12
Denmark (83–09) 84–86, 03–05 2 6
Finland (70–09) 76–77, 92–94, 96 3 6
France (80–09) 83–87, 94, 96–99, 04–06 4 13
Germany (70–09) 82–85, 92–94, 97–00, 03–07 4 16
Ireland (70–09) 75–77, 82–88 2 10
Italy (70–09) 82–83, 86–88, 92–97 3 11
Japan (70–09) 79–87, 06 2 10
Korea (81–09) 93–94, 98–99 2 4
Netherlands (70–09) 72–73, 81–83, 93, 04–05 4 8
New Zealand (86–09) 87, 89–93 2 6
Norway (86–09) 94–96, 99–00, 04–06 3 8
Portugal (88–09) 92, 94–95, 02–04, 06–07 4 8
Spain (85–09) 86–87, 92–94, 09 3 6
Sweden (70–09) 81–87, 94–97, 04–05 3 13
United Kingdom (70–09) 76–77, 79–84, 96–00, 05–06 4 15
United States (70–09) 71–72, 76–77, 80–82, 91, 96–98, 05–06 6 13
20 countries 66 199
Note: As ﬁscal consolidation is identiﬁed based on the changes in the CAPB from the previous year, the
period for the episodes is shorter by one year than the sample period.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of ﬁscal adjustment episodes by the duration.
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3.3. Determinants of ﬁscal adjustment
To assess to what extent the incidence of ﬁscal adjustment depends on contemporaneous or past
growth as well as other macroeconomic or ﬁscal factors, in this subsection, we analyze the
determinants of the decision on undertaking ﬁscal adjustment. To this effect, we estimate a panel logit
model where the dependent variable is equal to one during periods of ﬁscal adjustment and zero oth-
erwise. Although themulti-year ﬁscal adjustments can be regarded as a single episode, the ﬁscal authority
decides not only on initiating ﬁscal adjustment, but also on its continuation in the subsequent years.
Therefore, the dependent variable takes value of one for each year during an episode of ﬁscal
adjustment.19
Initial conditions such as the economic and policy environments can inﬂuence the decision on ﬁscal
adjustment. Therefore, the explanatory variables are classiﬁed under three categories: macroeco-
nomic, ﬁscal and political.
The resulting marginal effects are reported in Table 3.20 The ﬁrst column contains all variables,
while the subsequent columns omit ﬁrst the ﬁscal variables and then also the macroeconomic
ones (except contemporaneous or lagged growth).21 The result of this exercise is that current
growth is never signiﬁcant unless there are no further ﬁscal or other macroeconomic variables left in
the regression, in which case current growth becomes negative and signiﬁcant (column 9).
Lagged output gap, when included in the regressions, is signiﬁcant and negatively affects the proba-
bility of ﬁscal adjustment. When lagged output gap is omitted, lagged output growth becomes
signiﬁcantly negative instead. As for the coeﬃcient of current output growth being signiﬁcant in
column (9), it is not clear whether this indicates endogeneity or omitted-variable bias, given that it
only appears when no other macroeconomic or ﬁscal variables are present in the regression. Note
also that none of the political variables in column (9) are signiﬁcant either, which suggests that the
current output growth term in effect captures only the impact of ﬁscal and other macroeconomic
variables.
For the sake of comparison, we replicate also the analyses of Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012)
and Guajardo et al. (2014) with our data: these results are not reported but are available upon request.
19 For robustness, we also estimated similar regressions with only the ﬁrst year of each episode coded as ﬁnancial adjust-
ment, in line with Guichard et al. (2007). The results, available upon request, are broadly in line with those presented here.
20 As an alternative, we used also the probit model. However, the choice of model has no impact on the results. According to
Afonso et al. (2006), logit model is to be preferred because of its statistical advantages in dealing with binary outcomes. Table 3
reports results obtained when considering each year of ﬁscal adjustment. Alternative results with only the ﬁrst year of each
episode are very similar and are available upon request.
21 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
year episode
Number (year) Number (episode)
Fig. 2. Distribution of ﬁscal adjustment episodes by the period.
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Table 3
Probability of ﬁscal adjustment.
Variable (dummy) Each year of episodes
Marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDP growth (T) −0.003 (0.012) −0.014 (0.012) 0.013 (0.009) −0.012 (0.008) – −0.016 (0.011) 0.011 (0.009) −0.069** (0.034)
GDP growth (T-1) −0.017 (0.015) −0.013 (0.015) −0.0060*** (0.011) – −0.053*** (0.009) −0.013 (0.014) −0.060*** (0.010) −0.054*** (0.009)
GDP gap (T-1) −0.038** (0.015) −0.066*** (0.014) – – – −0.068*** (0.014)
Inﬂation (T-1) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001)
Long-term interest
rate (T-1)
0.048*** (0.010) 0.045*** (0.009) 0.043*** (0.007) 0.046*** (0.007) 0.042*** (0.007)
Primary balance (T-1) −0.022*** (0.008) – – – –
Gross debt (T-1) 0.002* (0.001) – – – –
Election (T) −0.038 (0.043) −0.037 (0.042) −0.045 (0.040) −0.019 (0.040) −0.039 (0.040) −0.039 (0.041) −0.046 (0.039) −0.042 (0.039) −0.075 (0.185)
System (Federal) 0.108* (0.067) 0.109* (0.063) 0.089** (0.041) 0.093** (0.040) 0.088** (0.041) 0.060 (0.052) 0.052 (0.039) 0.052 (0.039) 0.239 (0.175)
System (Presidential) −0.026 (0.075) −0.052 (0.067) −0.016 (0.049) −0.037 (0.046) −0.012 (0.049) −0.023 (0.061) 0.002 (0.049) 0.006 (0.049) −0.057 (0.221)
Observations 584 608 644 645 644 608 645 645 665
No. countries 20
Period 1970–2009
Note: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses and ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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When we do so, the current growth rate is signiﬁcant and positive when using the ﬁscal adjustment
episodes identiﬁed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012), and insigniﬁcant when using the ﬁscal
adjustment episodes of Guajardo et al. (2014). In other words, ﬁscal adjustments identiﬁed with the
standard CAPB-basedmethod aremore likely to occur when the growth performance is good. Our results
are thus more similar to those obtained with the narrative approach. Hence, the episodes identiﬁed
with our deﬁnition are less at risk of being endogenous than those of Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012).
However, since lagged output gap or lagged growth do appear signiﬁcant, the episodes identiﬁed with
our deﬁnition may demonstrate less evidence for exogeneity than the narrative episodes of Guajardo
et al. (2014).22
We turn now to the impact of our complete set of variables on the probability of ﬁscal
adjustment, as portrayed in column (1) of Table 3. The inﬂation rate has a positive effect on the
decision on ﬁscal adjustment, but only at the 10% signiﬁcance level. The long-term interest rate
plays a signiﬁcant role in prompting ﬁscal adjustment at the 1% signiﬁcance level: high long-term
interest rate imposes greater burden on government debt, so that it is likely to encourage ﬁscal ad-
justment. As for the ﬁscal variables, the primary balance of the previous year plays a signiﬁcant role.
A rise in the initial primary balance by 1% of GDP decreases the likelihood of ﬁscal adjustment by
2.2%. In contrast, the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is only weakly associated with ﬁscal adjustment: it is
signiﬁcant only at the 10% signiﬁcance level and the size of the effect is very small. Finally, most
political variables turn out insigniﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, there is no evidence supporting the ‘political
budget cycle’ story, whereby the incumbent adopts expansionary ﬁscal policy in an election year to
stimulate the economy so as to increase the chances of re-election. Instead, we ﬁnd that the proba-
bility of adopting ﬁscal adjustment does not decrease signiﬁcantly in the year of general election.
This may be because our data are composed of only OECD countries with a higher level of develop-
ment, democracy and greater transparency.23 Finally, federal nations are more likely to undertake
ﬁscal adjustment.
4. Speciﬁcation and results
In this section, we examine the effects of ﬁscal adjustment on the economic activity in the short
term, especially focusing on the existence of expansionary ﬁscal adjustment and its transmission. We
estimate the following ﬁxed-effects panel model:
Δ Δ Δ ΔY Y FA FAi t i t i t i t i t i t, , , , ,= + + + + + +− −α α β β0 1 1 0 1 1 μ λ ν (6)
where Yi,t represents the logarithm of real economic activity (GDP, private consumption, private in-
vestment, wage, interest, etc.) for country i = 1, 2, 3, ….N in year t = 1, 2, ….T. Economic variables are
in logs except for the unemployment and interest rates. ΔFA denotes the changes in the CAPB in
percent of GDP in periods of ﬁscal adjustment and zero otherwise. The term μi indicates country-
ﬁxed effects, λt denotes year-ﬁxed effects and νi is a reduced form innovation. For lag selection, we
start with several lags of the economic activity variables and changes in the CAPB and iteratively
reduce the lag length when the longest lag turned out to be insigniﬁcant. As a result, we select one
lag for ΔY and ΔFA each.24
With respect to the estimation, we follow the samemethodology as Guajardo et al. (2014) and Alesina
and Ardagna (2012). First, we estimate equation (6) by ordinary least squares and then compute the
estimated cumulative responses of real GDP and its components to a shock of 1% point change in the
CAPB-to-GDP ratio for the ﬁrst three years in order to measure the response on the level of real eco-
22 In the section on robustness, we present results where we control for possible endogeneity of ﬁscal adjustments.
23 Political budget cycles are discussed in Shi and Svensson (2006) and Klomp and Hann (2013).
24 Guajardo et al. (2014) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012) select 2 lags for similar speciﬁcations. For the robustness checks,
we also use 2 lags. The coeﬃcients of second lags of growth and ﬁscal adjustment are small and insigniﬁcant so that the results
of impulse-responses are not affected.
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nomic activity variables in the log terms.25 We calculate the standard errors of the impulse response
using the delta method.26
Table 4 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of the changes in the CAPB on the economic activity
variables in our baseline model. The ﬁrst column reports that growth responds negatively to contem-
poraneous changes in the CAPB, but positively to its lagged change. As the negative effect of
contemporaneous ﬁscal adjustment is much larger than the lagged positive effect,27 the ﬁscal adjust-
ment is found to have contractionary effect in the short term. In other words, non-Keynesian effects,
or expansionary ﬁscal adjustments, do not occur. In that, our results are very similar to those of Guajardo
et al. (2014) based on the narrative approach. The response of growth is mirrored in those of the in-
dividual components of GDP. The effects of current and lagged ﬁscal adjustment on private consumption
and investment are very much in line with those on growth (columns 2 and 3). As for the labor market,
the effect on the real wage is negative but insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, the effect on unemploy-
ment rate is large and positive at the 1% signiﬁcance level, both contemporaneously and with a lag.
This shows that ﬁscal adjustment reduces output and raises unemployment in the short term. Columns
(6) and (7) show the impacts of ﬁscal adjustment on interest rates. Interest rates fall when a cou-
ntry’s ﬁscal position improves, which is consistent with the ﬁnding of Ardagna (2009).
Table 5 shows the corresponding impulse-responses resulting from an improvement in the CAPB
by 1% of GDP for three years following ﬁscal adjustment, based on the results in Table 4. The growth
rates are cumulated to obtain the estimated impact of ﬁscal adjustment on the level of economic ac-
tivity, following Guajardo et al. (2014) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012). Fiscal adjustment has statistically
signiﬁcant effects on GDP, private consumption and other macroeconomic variables with the peak
contractionary effect occurring within 1 or 2 years. In particular, a ﬁscal adjustment equal to 1% of
GDP reduces real GDP by about 0.3% in the year of ﬁscal adjustment. These results are very similar to
those of Guajardo et al. (2014), despite the different deﬁnition of ﬁscal adjustments, speciﬁcation and
data. Fig. 3 compares the responses of GDP to a ﬁscal adjustment shock between our baseline and
Guajardo et al.’s (2014) baseline. Although the timing of peak contractionary effects is different, both
sets of results report negative effects on GDP sustained for three years and diminishing gradually over
time.28
In summary, our results suggest that ﬁscal consolidations have a signiﬁcant contractionary effect
in the short term. In addition, although Guajardo et al. (2014) raise some issues with respect to using
the CAPB, our own CAPB-based measure, which takes account of those criticisms, shows results which
are very similar to theirs.
5. Robustness checks
Next, we present the results of several alternative approaches to test the robustness of our results.
First, given that both our deﬁnition for computing the CAPB and the criteria for identifying ﬁscal ad-
justment have an element of arbitrariness in them, we consider alternative deﬁnitions. Second, as
discretionary ﬁscal policy cannot be entirely exogenous to the state of the economy, we address the
issue of endogeneity in our model. Third, we investigate the role played by the composition of ﬁscal
adjustment in terms of tax increases and spending cuts. Fourth, we check the robustness of our
ﬁndings to the inclusion of other variables to control for monetary and exchange rate policies, as well
25 In the ﬁxed-effects dynamic panel model, when lagged values of the dependent variable are included as regressors, ordi-
nary least squares estimates can be inconsistent due to the correlation of the lagged dependant variable with the error term.
Therefore, in this case, Arellano-Bond estimator (GMM estimator) is usually used. However, according to Roodman (2006), this
estimator is designed for “small T, large N” panels, and in case of suﬃciently large T panel, the bias is likely to be negligible. In
our dataset, T is over 30 years and N is 20 countries; so we do not need to use this estimator.
26 In statistics, the delta method is a methodology to derive an approximate probability distribution for a function of an as-
ymptotically normal statistical estimator (see Oehlert, 2008). We use the syntax for ‘Nonlinear combination of estimators’ using
the delta method in the Stata program.
27 An F-test for the two coeﬃcients being equal in absolute value is rejected with F(1, 585) = 19.17 and p-value of 0.0000.
28 Implementing only one of the two changes; accounting for the asset prices or country-speciﬁc thresholds separately, yields
results very similar those reported in Tables 4 and 5, suggesting that the two changes are, to some extent, substitutes for each
other. These results are available upon request.
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Table 4
Effect of ﬁscal adjustment on economic activity.
Dependent variable GDP
growth (%)
Private
consumption (%)
Private
investment (%)
Hourly
wage (%)
Unemployment
rate (%)
Short interest
rate (%)
Long interest
rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged dependent variable (T-1) 0.354*** (0.040) 0.357*** (0.040) 0.378*** (0.040) 0.519*** (0.036) 0.874*** (0.017) 0.719*** (0.029) 0.849*** (0.020)
ΔFA (T) −0.289*** (0.066) −0.305*** (0.075) −0.814*** (0.197) −0.059 (0.081) 0.332*** (0.031) −0.102* (0.056) 0.004 (0.029)
ΔFA(T-1) 0.153** (0.065) 0.154** (0.073) 0.471** (0.193) 0.080 (0.080) 0.083*** (0.032) −0.134** (0.053) −0.074*** (0.028)
Constant 3.602*** (0.475) 0.811 (0.543) −4.774*** (1.425) 2.088*** (0.641) 1.171*** (0.240) 4.836*** (0.446) 1.962*** (0.256)
Observations 645 645 645 602 645 612 644
R-squared 0.564 0.420 0.494 0.781 0.904 0.894 0.955
No. countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: The data on hourly wage are obtained from the OECE. StatExtracts/Labour/Earning dataset-manufacture (index 2005 = 100). The estimated results are the coeﬃcient estimates.
Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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as the institutional and political environment. Finally, we also investigate the sensitivity of our results
across country groups.
5.1. Alternative deﬁnitions of ﬁscal adjustment
Our CAPB measure and the resulting deﬁnition of ﬁscal adjustment are different from the extant
literature using the CAPB approach. In particular, the thresholds applied are arbitrary to some extent.
Therefore, we perform additional analysis to assess whether changes in the threshold affect critically
the results. First, we use alternative thresholds with respect to the standard deviation of CAPB changes.
Second, since the average and standard deviation of the changes in the CAPB for each country can be
affected by outliers, we drop the largest positive and negative values representing the changes in the
CAPB. Third, we replace the share price index with the house price index.29 Fourth, we use the CAPB
reported by the OECD instead of computing it ourselves.30 Finally, it may be argued that the assump-
29 The house price index data (1975–2009) are taken from the International House Price Database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
30 We use the CAPB data (underlying primary ﬁscal balance) from the OECD Economic Outlook No.88 which are said to elim-
inate the impact of one-off transactions from the cyclically-adjusted ﬁnancial balances. These data have been used in much of
the literature such as McDermott and Wescott (1996), Kamps (2006), Guichard et al. (2007).
Table 5
Macroeconomic responses to ﬁscal adjustment shock equal to 1% of GDP.
Dependent
variables
GDP Private
consumption
Private
investment
Hourly
wage
Unemployment
rate (%)
Short
interest
rate (%)
Long
interest
rate (%)
T −0.289***
(0.066)
−0.305***
(0.075)
−0.814***
(0.197)
−0.059
(0.081)
0.332***
(0.031)
−0.102*
(0.056)
0.004
(0.029)
T+1 −0.238**
(0.096)
−0.260**
(0.110)
−0.650**
(0.293)
−0.010*
(0.129)
0.373***
(0.036)
−0.208***
(0.060)
−0.071**
(0.033)
T+2 −0.220*
(0.114)
−0.244*
(0.130)
−0.588*
(0.350)
0.016*
(0.164)
0.325***
(0.031)
−0.149***
(0.045)
−0.060**
(0.029)
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses on the level of GDP and its components in terms of logs and on the in-
terest rate and unemployment in terms of the percentage. Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of responses of GDP to a ﬁscal adjustment shock.
Note: Guajardo et al. (2014) select 2 lag orders, but our speciﬁcation uses one lag. T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The
ﬁgure reports point estimates and one standard error bands.
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tion of unemployment proxying business-cycle ﬂuctuations is a strong one. Therefore, we replace it
with the output gap.31
Tables 6 and 7 show that the baseline results (column 1) are robust to a series of alternative cri-
teria for the deﬁnition of ﬁscal adjustment and also to alternative CAPB deﬁnitions. In particular, in
column (2), we apply a lower threshold for identifying ﬁscal adjustment while columns (3) and (4)
apply stricter thresholds. In each case, ﬁscal adjustment has a similarly sized negative effect on growth.
Dropping the outliers (column 5) similarly does not lead to substantially different results. The results
obtained when the house price index is used instead of stock prices (column 6) are not much differ-
ent from the baseline either.
The results with the OECD CAPB data show an insigniﬁcant negative effect (column 7). This dif-
ference is likely to be due to the different assumptions and methodology. As Alesina and Perotti (1995)
and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) point out, the OECDmethod depends on measures of potential output,
which are regarded as highly arbitrary, and a set of elasticities of taxes and expenditures.32 In addi-
tion, although the OECD purports to eliminate one-off transactions from the primary ﬁscal balance,
this adjustment may not be perfect because one-off transactions in its methodology are derived from
the deviation from trend in net capital transfers, not from individual records. For instance, the Neth-
erlands in 1996 is one of the cases that historical records indicate as having a one-off transaction in
the previous year, but is included in the ﬁscal adjustment episodes according to the OECD CAPB version.33
Given the methodological differences, we feel that the fact that we obtain different results with the
OECD CAPB ﬁgures actually strengthens our case.
Next, we replace unemployment with output gap as a proxy for business cycle ﬂuctuations. In column
(8), we use the output gap instead of unemployment both for government revenue and spending, while
in column (9), we use unemployment for spending and output gap for revenue. The results are again
broadly in line with the baseline.34
Table 7 compares the impulse-responses based on the estimation results. The stricter the thresh-
olds, the more negative the effect of ﬁscal adjustment on GDP. When dropping outliers, the negative
effects are smaller than in the baseline, but are still signiﬁcant. While the response in case of OECD
CAPB is not signiﬁcant, most estimates indicate a decline of GDP similar to the baseline result for three
years. Using output gap instead of unemployment as a proxy for business-cycle ﬂuctuations results
in a stronger (more negative) output response, especially when we use the output gap for both gov-
ernment revenue and spending.
Finally, in the preceding results, we used a single time trend for the whole period, 1970–2009.
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), in contrast, use two time trends: 1960–1975 and 1976–1994. While we
do not have enough data to estimate a separate trend for the 1970s (to account for the oil-price
shocks that took place during that decade, which was the motivation for the two time trends em-
ployed by Alesina and Ardagna, 1998), we re-estimated our results with two time trends based on
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992: 1970–91 and 1992–09. The impact of this change is
minimal and the results are very similar to those obtained with a single time trend (not reported but
available upon request).
5.2. Endogeneity of ﬁscal adjustment
Although we tried various approaches for identifying the episodes of discretionary ﬁscal adjust-
ment, it is very hard to identify them unambiguously. In particular, the cyclical correction is not fully
free from potential endogeneity. In this subsection, therefore, we check the robustness of our results
by relaxing the exogeneity assumption. First, we check the assumption of the baseline model that the
31 The output gap is used also by Ardanaz et al. (2015). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this modiﬁ-
cation.
32 See Ardanaz et al. (2015) for an extended discussion about the impact of uncertainty about such elasticities and other as-
sumptions on estimates of CAPB.
33 The list of ﬁscal adjustment episodes identiﬁed based on the OECD CAPB is available upon request.
34 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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Table 6
Effect of ﬁscal adjustment on growth: alternative deﬁnitions.
Alternatives Criteria for the deﬁnition CAPB version
Baseline Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Threshold 3 Dropping
outliers
House price
index
OECD CAPB Output gap UE (G), Output
gap (R)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single year (η) 1 3/4 3/2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Multiple years (λ) 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/4, 1, 3/2 1/2, 2, 3 3/4, 2, 3 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2
GDP growth (T-1) 0.354*** (0.040) 0.357*** (0.040) 0.355*** (0.040) 0.352*** (0.040) 0.357*** (0.040) 0.391*** (0.039) 0.418*** (0.043) 0.409*** (0.040) 0.365*** (0.041)
ΔFA (T) −0.289*** (0.066) −0.274*** (0.065) −0.320*** (0.070) −0.302*** (0.068) −0.264*** (0.065) −0.214*** (0.057) −0.071 (0.100) −0.524*** (0.071) −0.322*** (0.077)
ΔFA (T-1) 0.153** (0.065) 0.146** (0.064) 0.191*** (0.069) 0.149** (0.067) 0.152** (0.064) 0.078 (0.056) −0.034 (0.097) 0.195*** (0.072) 0.133* (0.075)
Constant 3.602*** (0.475) 3.665*** (0.479) 3.621*** (0.474) 3.595*** (0.474) 3.618*** (0.478) 2.544*** (0.437) 2.075*** (0.420) 4.098*** (0.511) 4.206*** (0.530)
Observations 645 645 645 645 645 620 518 603 603
No. FA year 199 219 157 100 204 240 167 174 168
R-squared 0.564 0.563 0.566 0.564 0.562 0.560 0.576 0.611 0.583
No. countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 20
Period 70−09 70−09 70−09 70−09 70−09 70−09 80−09 70−09 70−09
Note: The new threshold means the change of multiples of the standard deviation for identifying ﬁscal adjustment. η and λ are the multiples for a given year and multi-years respec-
tively. Column 2 has weaker threshold than the baseline. However, Column 3 and 4 have stronger threshold than the baseline. Column (7) uses the underlying government primary
balance (a percentage of potential GDP) data for 1980–2009 from OECD Outlook No.88. 19 OECD countries excluding Germany due to the limited period for the CAPB are included. Column
(8) uses the output gap instead of unemployment both for government spending and revenues. Column (9) uses unemployment for government spending and output gap for revenues.
Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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changes in the CAPB during the periods of ﬁscal adjustment are exogenous and uncorrelated with those
in other ‘normal’ periods. Following Alesina and Ardagna (2012), we investigate whether the esti-
mated coeﬃcients of ﬁscal adjustment change when the changes in the CAPB in normal periods (i.e.
periods without ﬁscal adjustment) are included as an additional term (ΔNFAi,t-j).
Δ Δ Δ ΔY Y FA NFAj j
j
i t i t i t j i t j i t
j
, , , ,= + + + + + +− − −
= =
∑ ∑α α β γ0 1 1
0
1
0
1
μ λ νi t, (7)
Second, we estimate the effects of ﬁscal adjustment on growth under the assumption that the
decisions on ﬁscal adjustment and its size are endogenous to the state of the economy. This means
that since the cyclical correction cannot remove the automatic changes of ﬁscal variables in response
to output entirely, some of the discretionary ﬁscal changes are related to the ﬂuctuations of contem-
poraneous output. As a result, the ﬁscal adjustment variable (ΔFAi,t-j) can be correlated with the
contemporaneous error term (νi,t): E(νi,t |ΔFAi,t-j) ≠ 0. Therefore, similar to Hernández de Cos and
Moral-Benito (2011), who also take the endogeneity into consideration, we estimate the effect of
ﬁscal adjustment via two-stage least squares (2SLS).35 We select the ﬁscal adjustments based on the
narrative approach by Guajardo et al. (2014) as the ﬁrst instrument because it is more likely to be
exogenous given that the identiﬁcation is based on historical records. In addition, we use lagged
long-term interest rate which we showed to be strongly correlated with ﬁscal adjustment in the
logit analysis of section 4 and is predetermined but not strictly exogenous to the contemporaneous
error term.
The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. First, when including the changes in the CAPB
during normal periods, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of ﬁscal adjustment (Table 8) and
the response of GDP to a ﬁscal adjustment shock (Table 9) are somewhat larger than in the
baseline model, but otherwise the results change little: we still observe contractionary effects
which are very similar to the baseline. Importantly, the changes in the CAPB that are not associated
with ﬁscal adjustment (NFA) do not have any effect on growth, as expected. This means that the
assumption of ﬁscal adjustment being different from other changes in the CAPB in normal periods is
reasonable.
Next, when using instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity of ﬁscal adjustment,
the effect on growth is stronger (more negative) than in the baseline. This pattern appears regardless
of the instruments used. Table 10 reports the results of ﬁrst stage regressions, conﬁrming the valid-
ity of the instruments considered. Both instruments have strong relationwith ﬁscal adjustment. However,
the test results indicate that the narrative ﬁscal adjustment of Guajardo et al. (2014) has more ex-
35 Although some authors such as Biorn and Klette (1999) advocate the use of the GMM estimator to tackle endogeneity, we
use 2SLS rather than GMM estimator because our dataset has a small number of countries (20) and a large number of time
periods (30). For this analysis, we use ‘xtivreg2’ stata module by Schaffer (2010).
Table 7
Comparison of response of GDP to alternative measures.
Baseline Criteria for the deﬁnition CAPB version
Threshold
1
Threshold
2
Threshold
3
Dropping
outliers
House
price
index
OECD CAPB Output gap UE (G),
Output
gap (R)
T −0.289***
(0.066)
−0.274***
(0.065)
−0.320***
(0.070)
−0.302***
(0.068)
−0.264***
(0.065)
−0.214***
(0.057)
−0.071
(0.100)
−0.524***
(0.071)
−0.312***
(0.077)
T+1 −0.238**
(0.096)
−0.226**
(0.097)
−0.243**
(0.099)
−0.259***
(0.098)
−0.206**
(0.097)
−0.220**
(0.086)
−0.136
(0.158)
−0.544***
(0.118)
−0.306***
(0.116)
T+2 −0.220*
(0.114)
−0.209*
(0.115)
−0.216*
(0.117)
−0.244**
(0.115)
−0.185
(0.114)
−0.222**
(0.104)
−0.163
(0.192)
−0.552***
(0.143)
−0.301**
(0.138)
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses of GDP to a shock of ﬁscal adjustment equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the
year of ﬁscal adjustment. Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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planatory power than the lagged long-term interest rate. When we use both instruments at the same
time, the results are also rather similar to those obtained with each instrument alone. In addition,
according to the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity of ﬁscal adjustment, the null hypothesis
that the ﬁscal adjustment can be treated as exogenous is rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level. There-
fore, we can conclude that ﬁscal adjustment identiﬁed by the changes in the CAPB is not strictly
exogenous to growth. Nevertheless, the results corrected for endogeneity of ﬁscal adjustment support
our baseline ﬁnding of contractionary effects.
5.3. Does composition of ﬁscal adjustment matter?
Many studies analyze whether the effects of ﬁscal adjustment depends on its composition. They
generally agree that ﬁscal adjustments focusing on the spending side are more likely to have expan-
sionary effects on GDP than those on the tax side. Therefore, in this subsection, we investigate what
role the composition of ﬁscal adjustment plays in the response of economic growth. First, we divide
the ﬁscal adjustments episodes into two types: ‘spending-based’, in which the change in the CAPB is
mainly (by at least 50%) due to spending cuts, and ‘tax-based’, in which the change in the CAPB is
mainly due to revenue increases (Guajardo et al., 2014 and McDermott and Wescott, 1996, apply the
same criterion). Next, we implement another categorization of ﬁscal adjustments, splitting them into
three types: ‘pure spending-based’ ones where the improvement in the CAPB is entirely due to spend-
ing cuts, ‘pure tax-based’ ones which are totally due to revenue increases, and ‘mixed’ cases that combine
the two types of adjustment.
Fig. 4 shows the estimated effects of ﬁscal adjustment according to its composition. First, although
spending-based adjustments do not have a signiﬁcant expansionary effect, they also do not have
Table 8
Effects of ﬁscal adjustment on growth: controlling for endogeneity.
Estimated method OLS Augmented OLS 2SLS
Added variable/IV Baseline CAPBNFA Narrative FA One lagged
long-term
interest rate
Narrative FA and
long-term interest
rate (T-1)
GDP growth (T-1) 0.354*** (0.040) 0.356*** (0.040) 0.402*** (0.049) 0.244*** (0.071) 0.387*** (0.049)
ΔFA (T) −0.289*** (0.066) −0.297*** (0.066) −0.581*** (0.186) −1.259** (0.512) −0.698*** (0.179)
ΔFA (T-1) 0.153** (0.065) 0.147** (0.065) 0.182** (0.076) 0.345*** (0.122) 0.205*** (0.076)
ΔNFA (T) – 0.025 (0.052) – –
ΔNFA (T-1) – 0.087 (0.053) – –
Constant 3.602*** (0.475) 3.680*** (0.478) −4.085*** (0.349) −3.524*** (0.428) −4.605*** (0.357)
Observations 645 645 502 644 502
R-squared 0.564 0.566 0.628 0.399 0.610
No. countries 20 20 17 20 17
Note: NFAmeans Non-ﬁscal adjustment as periods without ﬁscal adjustment. Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05.
Table 9
Response of GDP to a ﬁscal adjustment shock of 1% of GDP.
Estimated method OLS Augmented OLS 2SLS
Added
variable/IV
Baseline CAPBNFA Narrative FA One lagged
long-term
interest rate
Narrative FA,
long-term interest
rate (T-1)
T −0.289*** (0.066) −0.297*** (0.066) −0.581*** (0.186) −1.259** (0.512) −0.698*** (0.179)
T+1 −0.238** (0.096) −0.256*** (0.097) −0.632*** (0.221) −1.221** (0.476) −0.763*** (0.209)
T+2 −0.220* (0.114) −0.241** (0.115) −0.652*** (0.239) −1.212** (0.471) −0.788*** (0.225)
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses of GDP to a shock of ﬁscal adjustment equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the
year of ﬁscal adjustment. NFA means Non-ﬁscal adjustment as periods without ﬁscal adjustment. The standard errors in pa-
rentheses are computed via the delta method, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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signiﬁcantly negative effect on GDP and private consumption except in the year of ﬁscal adjustment.
When comparedwith tax-based adjustments, spending-based adjustments are less contractionary and
can even offset the large negative effects of tax-based adjustment because the response of the baseline
is in between the responses associated with the two types of ﬁscal adjustment. This result is consis-
tent with Alesina and Ardagna (2012). On the other hand, tax-based ﬁscal adjustments have a
contractionary and statistically signiﬁcant effect on GDP with a peak negative effect of −0.68% and on
private consumption with a peak negative effect of −0.71% within three years. When the composition
of ﬁscal adjustment is classiﬁed into three types, as shown in column (2) of Fig. 4, the results do not
differ much. While the results for mixed adjustments are almost the same as the baseline, pure tax-
based ﬁscal adjustments decrease GDP signiﬁcantly whereas pure spending-based ﬁscal adjustments
appear contractionary but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant even in the year of ﬁscal adjustment.
An alternative way is to identify ﬁscal adjustments based on large changes of ﬁscal variables rather
than by looking at changes of ﬁscal balance: as an increase in cyclically-adjusted revenues or a de-
crease in cyclically-adjusted spending. Although this method is different from the conventional method
based on ﬁscal balance, it has several advantages. First, we can capture some episodes of ﬁscal ad-
justment which might be otherwise excluded. This is the case when the ﬁscal adjustment on spending
(revenue) side is offset by a counter-balancing change of revenue (spending). Second, we can reduce
the risk that the results are driven by a particular threshold (e.g. 50%) chosen to identify tax-based
and spending-based adjustments. Therefore, we re-identify ﬁscal adjustments based on large changes
of cyclically-adjusted revenues and spending respectively.36 The former are denoted as ‘tax side’ and
the latter denoted as ‘spending side’. Then, we replace ΔFA in the baseline speciﬁcation with these
two types of ﬁscal adjustments to estimate their effects on GDP and private consumption.
36 The deﬁnition for a ﬁscal adjustment on tax (spending) side follows the 4 criteria in Section 4, but uses changes of cyclically-
adjusted revenues (spending) instead of changes of CAPB. For example, as the criterion for a ﬁscal adjustment of a given year,
tax (spending)-side adjustment is deﬁnedwhen the cyclically-adjusted revenue increases (decreases) by at least the average + stan-
dard deviation of the changes of cyclically-adjusted revenue (spending) for each country in 1 year.
Table 10
First-stage regression of ﬁscal adjustment in 2SLS.
Dependent variable CAPBFA
Instrument variable Narrative FA One lagged
long-term
interest rate
Narrative FA,
Long-term interest
rate(T-1)
GDP growth (T-1) −0.082*** (0.027) −0.103*** (0.025) −0.081*** (0.027)
ΔFA (T-1) 0.143*** (0.042) 0.173*** (0.040) 0.124*** (0.042)
Narrative FA 0.560*** (0.065) 0.556*** (0.065)
Long-term interest rate(T-1) 0.098*** (0.027) 0.087*** (0.027)
Constant 0.004 (0.210) −0.270 (0.252) 0.381 (0.241)
Observations 502 644 502
R-squared 0.388 0.251 0.401
No. countries 17 20 17
Summary results for the instrument variable test from the ﬁrst-stage regressions
F test of excluded instruments (F value)a 73.87*** 12.62*** 42.40***
Underidentiﬁcation test (LM value)b 68.26*** 13.20*** 77.36***
Weak identiﬁcation test (F value)c 73.87*** 13.11 42.70***
Endogeneity test of (P value)d 0.013 0.023 0.001
Overidentiﬁcation test of all IVs (P value)e – – 0.072
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05.
aAngrist–Pischke Multivariate F test.
bAnderson canon. Correlation (Ho: equation is underidentiﬁed).
cCragg–Donald Wald test with Stock–Yogo critical values (Ho: equation is weakly identiﬁed).
dDurbin–Wu–Hausman Test (Ho: OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates).
eSargan Statistic (H0: The instruments are valid).
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Fig. 5 shows the estimated effects of ﬁscal adjustment according to its composition. While ﬁscal
adjustments based on an increase in revenues have a largely contractionary and statistically
signiﬁcant effect on GDP and private consumption, ﬁscal adjustments based on a decrease in
spending have a small expansionary but not statistically signiﬁcant effect on GDP and negligible
effects on private consumption. Therefore, we still cannot ﬁnd any ﬁrm evidence of expansionary
effects even in the case of ﬁscal adjustment based on large spending-cuts. However, this
reconﬁrms that spending-based adjustments are less contractionary than tax-based ones,
which is consistent with the previous results of compositions of ﬁscal adjustment based on the
CAPB.
Guajardo et al. (2014) argue that a possible reason for the different effects depending on the com-
positions of ﬁscal adjustment is that monetary policy is more favorable in case of spending cuts. They
suggest that central banks conduct monetary stimulus more actively following spending cuts than after
tax hikes so that the policy rate increases in response to tax hikes and decreases in response to
Contribution (more than 50%) Policy (Pure-tax, Pure-spending, Mixed)
(1) (2)
GDP
Private consumption
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Fig. 4. The effects of the composition of ﬁscal adjustment.
Note: T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The ﬁgure reports point estimates and one standard error band. Tax-based means
that the improvement in the CAPB for ﬁscal adjustment is by more than 50% due to the tax hikes. On the other hand, pure-tax
indicates that the improvement in the CAPB is totally due to the tax hikes.
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spending cuts.37 Therefore, we investigate the response of short-term interest rate to the two types
of ﬁscal adjustment. As Fig. 6 shows, the response of the short-term interest rate is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent according to the two types of ﬁscal adjustment only in the year of ﬁscal adjustment. After one
year, the short term interest rate falls signiﬁcantly in both cases. Therefore, this result can partially
37 Guajardo et al. (2014) contend that central banks prefer spending-based, rather than tax-based, ﬁscal adjustment because
they interpret the former as a signal for a stronger commitment to ﬁscal discipline, but they are averse to an increase in taxes
such as the indirect tax because of the possibility of subsequent high inﬂation, inducing the Central Bank to raise interest rates.
GDP Private Consumption
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0.0
0.3
0 T T+1 T+2
Baseline Tax side
Spending side
Fig. 5. The effects of composition of ﬁscal adjustment: Based on the changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues and spending.
Note: T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The ﬁgure reports point estimates and one standard error bands. ‘Tax side’ means
the ﬁscal adjustment based on large increases in cyclically-adjusted revenues and ‘spending side’ indicates the ﬁscal adjust-
ment based on large decreases of cyclically-adjusted spending.
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Fig. 6. Response of short-term interest rate to two compositions of ﬁscal adjustment.
Note: T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The ﬁgure reports point estimates and one standard error band.
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support the argument of Guajardo et al. (2014) that the different effects depending on the composi-
tion of ﬁscal adjustment are ascribed to different monetary policy stances.
5.4. The role of the economic environment
Next, we check the robustness of our ﬁndings by including the short-term interest rate and the
real effective exchange rate among the regressors.38 These two additional control variables are aimed
at accounting for monetary policy and exchange rate policy respectively. Table 11 and Fig. 7 show the
results. The ﬁt of the regression improves when we include variables relating to the economic policy.
The coeﬃcient of ﬁscal adjustment, as well as that for tax-based adjustment, remains signiﬁcantly
negative, although they are smaller than those without controlling for policy variables. Similarly,
spending-based ﬁscal adjustment has a smaller negative coeﬃcient, but is still statistically insignif-
icant. The change of effects can be attributed to monetary policy in that the short-term interest rate
has a signiﬁcantly negative effect on growth, as expected, but the exchange rate is not signiﬁcant. Fig. 7
conﬁrms that ﬁscal adjustments have less contractionary effect on GDP when we control for mone-
tary policy than in the baseline. Therefore, monetary policy can affect the response of GDP to ﬁscal
adjustment shocks. If the short-term interest rate falls, it leads to an increase in GDP. Therefore, if ﬁscal
adjustment coincides with a large reduction in the short-term interest rate, this may stimulate the
economy in the following periods. However, even in this case, this result is to be attributed not to the
ﬁscal adjustment, but to the lax monetary policy. In regard to the effects of composition of ﬁscal ad-
justment, Fig. 7 shows that the response of GDP is larger in tax-based ﬁscal adjustments than in spending-
based ones. Therefore, as Fig. 6 in the previous subsection shows, if the discretionary monetary policy
responds differently according to the type of ﬁscal adjustment, this could help account for the differ-
ent effects depending on the composition of ﬁscal adjustment. However, it cannot be a decisive factor,
contrary to the argument of Guajardo et al. (2014), in that when we control for the short-term inter-
est rate, there is still a large difference between the effects of tax-based and spending-based ﬁscal
adjustment on GDP.
Furthermore, there can be other omitted factors that are likely to inﬂuence the effects of ﬁscal ad-
justment on economic activity. The omission of relevant variables could bias the response of output
in estimating the effects of ﬁscal adjustments. Therefore, we add additional variables into the base-
line model one by one. The initial government debt is considered because a high debt level can lead
to expansionary ﬁscal adjustment via the wealth effect. International factors such as the exchange rate
38 Nominal short term interest rate is obtained from OECD Economic Outlook No.88. Real effective exchange rate is drawn
from international ﬁnance statistics of the Bank for International Settlements. When using the real interest rate calculated using
GDP deﬂator, the result is not affected.
Table 11
Effect of ﬁscal adjustment on growth: composition and policy variables.
Variables GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
GDP growth (T-1) 0.354*** (0.040) 0.374*** (0.040) 0.373*** (0.042) 0.389*** (0.041)
FA (T) −0.289*** (0.066) −0.222*** (0.066)
FA (T-1) 0.153** (0.065) 0.131** (0.063)
Tax-based (T) −0.622*** (0.096) −0.532*** (0.098)
Tax-based (T-1) 0.228** (0.100) 0.222** (0.099)
Spending-based (T) −0.104 (0.077) −0.053 (0.077)
Spending-based (T-1) 0.103 (0.073) 0.075 (0.070)
Short- term interest rate −0.124*** (0.035) −0.102*** (0.035)
Real effective exchange rate 0.019 (0.012) 0.018 (0.012)
Constant 3.602*** (0.475) 3.786*** (0.469) 4.521*** (0.545) 4.320*** (0.539)
Observations 645 645 615 615
R-squared 0.564 0.580 0.600 0.613
No. countries 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05.
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regime and ﬁnancial openness can be taken into account as another potential factor. Furthermore, Ilzetzki
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the degrees of exchange rate ﬂexibility and openness to current and capital account
transactions are critical determinants of the size of ﬁscal multiplier. Therefore, we include the ex-
change rate regime and ﬁnancial openness index.39 We also include dummies for Euro Area membership
and for participation in IMF programs. Political environment can similarly play a role and therefore
we include a dummy for countries with a federal system of government and a measure of ruling party
ideology (the latter is obtained from Potrafke, 2009). Finally, we also include lagged inﬂation and the
long-term interest rate as two potentially important macroeconomic variables.
Tables 12 and 13 show the regression results obtained when we control for the impact of these
additional factors. The results are very similar to the baseline results, as is clear from column (10) of
Table 12, where all the variables are included in the same regression. Here GDP growth (T-1), ΔFA (T)
and ΔFA (T-1) remain highly signiﬁcant, as in the baseline, and the signs as well as magnitudes of their
coeﬃcients remain remarkably similar. Moreover, all of the additional controls turn out insigniﬁcant
in column (10), with the exception of gross debt, inﬂation and long-term interest rates, all of which
have a negative effect on growth, which is intuitive. As regards columns (1)–(9), where one variable
at a time is added to the baseline, we ﬁnd that only the exchange rate regime and the long-term in-
terest rate are signiﬁcant.
Aside from the fairly comprehensive list of variables considered, regulatory reform such as labor
and product market institutions, and structural reforms should be considered as signiﬁcant and rel-
evant factors inﬂuencing the estimated effects of ﬁscal adjustment on economic activity. Several studies
investigate the interactions between ﬁscal adjustment and these market institutions and structural
reforms and show that these regulatory policies can play a signiﬁcant role in initiating ﬁscal
adjustment and determining its success (Guichard et al., 2007; Hauptmeier et al., 2006; Tagkalakis,
39 For exchange rate regime, we use the IMF oﬃcial classiﬁcation from Ilzetzki et al. (2009) to determine the exchange rate
regime of each country in every year and construct a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for the ﬁxed regime and 0 for
the ﬂexible regime, following Ilzetzki et al. (2011). For ﬁnancial openness index, we use the KAOPEN index based on restric-
tions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions from Chinn and Ito (2008).
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Fig. 7. The effects of ﬁscal adjustment on GDP.
Note: T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The ﬁgure reports point estimates and one standard error band.
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Table 12
Effect of ﬁscal adjustment on growth: controlling for other factors.
Variables Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP growth (T-1) 0.354***
(0.040)
0.387***
(0.042)
0.348***
(0.040)
0.354***
(0.040)
0.356***
(0.040)
0.354***
(0.040)
0.354***
(0.040)
0.354***
(0.040)
0.349***
(0.040)
0.347***
(0.040)
0.346***
(0.043)
ΔFA (T) −0.289***
(0.066)
−0.280***
(0.066)
−0.302***
(0.066)
−0.291***
(0.066)
−0.290***
(0.066)
−0.291***
(0.066)
−0.288***
(0.066)
−0.289***
(0.066)
−0.291***
(0.066)
−0.260***
(0.066)
−0.249***
(0.068)
ΔFA (T-1) 0.153**
(0.065)
0.146**
(0.065)
0.142**
(0.065)
0.152**
(0.065)
0.151**
(0.065)
0.152**
(0.065)
0.152**
(0.065)
0.153**
(0.065)
0.152**
(0.065)
0.172***
(0.065)
0.173***
(0.066)
Gross debt (T-1) −0.001
(0.004)
−0.008*
(0.005)
Exchange rate regime (Fixed) −0.436**
(0.218)
−0.254
(0.237)
Financial openness 0.148
(0.100)
0.165
(0.120)
Euro areaa −0.200
(0.447)
−0.208
(0.286)
IMF program (T-1)b 0.239
(0.442)
−0.020
(0.466)
Federal system −0.566
(0.842)
−0.617
(0.830)
Ruling party’s ideologyc −0.003
(0.079)
0.034
(0.083)
Inﬂation (T-1) −0.011
(0.009)
−0.027**
(0.012)
Long-term interest rate (T-1) −0.098**
(0.044)
−0.155***
(0.059)
Constant 3.602***
(0.475)
−0.117
(0.550)
3.890***
(0.495)
0.526
(0.529)
3.602***
(0.475)
0.294
(0.521)
3.804***
(0.562)
3.611***
(0.538)
−2.436**
(1.105)
4.740***
(0.611)
0.601
(1.582)
Observations 645 609 645 639 645 645 645 645 645 644 602
R-squared 0.564 0.593 0.567 0.567 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.565 0.569 0.607
No. countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
aThe dummy variable takes the value 1 for the countries that were members of the Euro zone in 1999 and afterwards, and 0 otherwise.
bThe dummy variable takes the value 1 for the countries under IMF programs such as SBA, EFF, SAF, and ESAF, and 0 otherwise.
cParty ideology takes values from 1 to 5, with 1–2 reserved for right-wing governments, 4–5 for left wing ones and 3 used for central or mixed ones. Source: Potrafke (2009).
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Table 13
Response of GDP to a ﬁscal adjustment shock of 1% of GDP.
Control
variable
Baseline Gross debt Exchange
rate
regime
Financial
openness
Euro area IMF
programs
Federal
system
Party’s
ideology
Inﬂation Long-term
interest
rate
All (1–9)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
T −0.289***
(0.066)
−0.280***
(0.066)
−0.302***
(0.066)
−0.290***
(0.066)
−0.290***
(0.066)
−0.291***
(0.066)
−0.288***
(0.066)
−0.289***
(0.066)
−0.291***
(0.066)
−0.260***
(0.066)
−0.249***
(0.068)
T+1 −0.238**
(0.096)
−0.241**
(0.100)
−0.264***
(0.097)
−0.243**
(0.097)
−0.242**
(0.097)
−0.242**
(0.097)
−0.237**
(0.096)
−0.238**
(0.096)
−0.241**
(0.096)
−0.178*
(0.097)
−0.162
(0.104)
T+2 −0.220*
(0.114)
−0.226*
(0.120)
−0.251**
(0.114)
−0.226**
(0.114)
−0.225**
(0.114)
−0.225**
(0.114)
−0.219*
(0.114)
−0.220*
(0.114)
−0.223**
(0.113)
−0.150
(0.116)
−0.132
(0.124)
Note: The table shows the point estimate responses of GDP to a shock of ﬁscal adjustment equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. The standard errors in parentheses
are computed via the delta method, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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2009).40 However, when these are controlled for, the qualitative effects on economic activity of ﬁscal
adjustment does not change (Alesina and Ardagna, 2012; Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito, 2011).
Although we do not address the effects of labor and product market institutions and structural reforms
during the ﬁscal adjustment episode in this paper, they can affect the responses of output to ﬁscal
adjustment in the long term as well as quantitatively via employment and investment behavior.
5.5. Effects of ﬁscal adjustment across country groups
The effects of ﬁscal adjustment on the economic activity may be different according to the sensi-
tivity of private agents, which in turn depend on the past trajectory of ﬁscal policy. While our deﬁnition
of ﬁscal adjustment controls for country-speciﬁc heterogeneity, in this subsection, we explore this issue
further by dividing the 20 countries into two groups on the basis of two criteria: the frequency of ﬁscal
adjustments and the volatility of discretionary ﬁscal policy. For the ﬁrst criterion, high and low fre-
quency groups include 10 countries each. Similarly, high and low ﬂuctuation groups each consist of
10 countries according to the standard deviation of changes in the CAPB.41
Table 14 reports the estimated responses of GDP and private consumption to a ﬁscal adjustment
shock. Interestingly, for the high group in terms of both frequency and ﬂuctuation, economic activity
displays a signiﬁcantly negative response only in the year of ﬁscal adjustment. On the other hand, the
low groups in frequency and ﬂuctuation alike display a strong response to ﬁscal adjustment in all years.
This ﬁnding supports the notion that economic agents respondmore sensitively to unexpected or unusual
shocks. When ﬁscal policy undergoes frequent changes, agents become accustomed to such changes
and their responses become smaller.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the short-termmacroeconomic effects of ﬁscal adjustment in 20 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1970–2009. This issue has been studied in many previous contributions already.
Recently, it has become more central in academic and policy circles due to the rising ﬁscal deﬁcits
and public debts during the current global crisis. Much of the literature argues that ﬁscal adjust-
ments can promote economic output even in the short term. However, after identifying ﬁscal adjustment
episodes from historical documents, Guajardo et al. (2014) conclude that ﬁscal adjustments are always
contractionary. They also criticize the CAPB-based measures used in the rest of literature as being im-
precise and biased toward overstating the potential expansionary effects of ﬁscal adjustments.
This paper reconsiders the CAPB-based measure in order to identify the ﬁscal adjustment epi-
sodes more accurately, taking into account the problems identiﬁed by Guajardo et al. (2014). The main
features of our new measure of ﬁscal adjustment are as follows. First, we consider the effect of asset
price ﬂuctuations on tax revenues when cyclically correcting the ﬁscal balance. Second, our criteria
for selecting ﬁscal adjustment episodes allow for the heterogeneity of individual countries in ﬁscal
policy, contrary to the uniform approach in the previous literature. Third, our criteria account for tem-
porary one-off transactions and temporary adverse shocks which can undermine the accuracy of the
CAPB. Although Guajardo et al. (2014) argue that the CAPB is an unreliable guide regarding ﬁscal
adjustment, our new criteria identify ﬁscal adjustment episodes that largely overlap with their narrative-
based ones.
Based on the ﬁscal adjustments identiﬁed, we estimate the effects of ﬁscal adjustment on eco-
nomic activity. Our key result is that a ﬁscal adjustment has contractionary effects on economic activity
in the short term. This provides little support for the expansionary ﬁscal adjustment hypothesis: such
‘non-Keynesian effects’ are very limited and probably occur only under speciﬁc conditions, not gen-
erally. This is consistent with the results of Guajardo et al. (2014). As for the role of the composition
40 Tagkalakis (2009) shows that a reduction in the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate, weak bargaining coordination
and centralization of union increase the likelihood of initiating and of successfully concluding a ﬁscal adjustment, but more
ﬂexible employment protection legislation and product market regulation work in the opposite direction.
41 Further details and the list of countries in each group are available upon request.
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Table 14
Effects of ﬁscal adjustment across country groups.
Variable GDP Private consumption
Group Baseline Frequency Fluctuation Baseline Frequency Fluctuation
High Low High Low High Low High Low
T −0.289***
(0.066)
−0.151*
(0.081)
−0.413***
(0.115)
−0.166**
(0.081)
−0.571***
(0.125)
−0.305***
(0.075)
−0.137*
(0.085)
−0.493***
(0.139)
−0.097
(0.085)
−0.737***
(0.155)
T+1 −0.238**
(0.096)
−0.071
(0.122)
−0.414**
(0.165)
−0.130
(0.128)
−0.450**
(0.170)
−0.260**
(0.110)
−0.085
(0.134)
−0.522***
(0.190)
−0.006
(0.137)
−0.682***
(0.212)
T+2 −0.220*
(0.114)
−0.046
(0.143)
−0.414**
(0.195)
−0.112
(0.161)
−0.427**
(0.187)
−0.244*
(0.130)
−0.064
(0.163)
−0.531**
(0.216)
0.042
(0.176)
−0.670***
(0.233)
Observations 645 336 309 330 315 645 336 309 330 315
R-squared 0.564 0.605 0.586 0.627 0.576 0.420 0.478 0.443 0.559 0.374
No.
countries
20 10 10 10 10 20 10 10 10 10
Note: T denotes the year of ﬁscal adjustment. Standard errors in parentheses are computed via the delta method, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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of ﬁscal adjustment, spending-based ﬁscal adjustments lead to smaller reductions of output than tax-
based ﬁscal adjustments. This ﬁnding is in line with most of the literature regardless of the approach
used.
Further work could explore in more depth the effects of ﬁscal adjustments. First, as for the reasons
behind the different effects of tax-based and spending-based adjustments, more detailed disaggre-
gation of ﬁscal spending and taxes could be used for the analysis. Second, most of the literature on
ﬁscal policy has studied developed countries such as the OECD because of data limitations. However,
as the data for developing countries have become more easily available lately, the ﬁscal adjustment
in developing countries also needs to be investigated for the comparison with developed countries’
results. Another possible extension would address the anticipation effects by private agents through
comparing the narrative data based on announced plans with the CAPB-based data based on actual
outcomes. However, to capture the timing of ﬁscal adjustment accurately, quarterly rather than annual
data may be required.
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